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COMMERCIAL PAPER
Ronald L. Hersbergen*
RIGHTS OF PARTIES TO INSTRUMENTS GONE ASTRAY
The Second Circuit Court of Appeal held in Smith v. Louisiana
Bank & Trust Co.,' that a co-payee of a check whose indorsement had
been forged may sue the drawer on the check, despite the fact that
the co-payee had never in fact been in possession of the instrument
and could not therefore be a holder of it.2 The court may have been
willing to overlook certain logical imperfections implicit in such a
holding3 because the rule of M. Feitel House Wrecking Co. v. Citizens
Bank & Trust Co.4 prevents actions on a check against the drawee
bank or a collecting bank by a payee whose indorsement has been
forged. Briefly stated, this is the "circuity" rule of Feitel: when a
collecting bank honors a check bearing a forgery of the payee's in-
dorsement and receives the proceeds thereof from the drawee, there
is no valid acceptance by either the drawee or the collecting bank,
and hence no funds of the drawer have actually been paid out; there-
fore, the payee's sole action is against the drawer, since "the check
has never in reality been paid."'5 The drawer then has a cause of
action against the drawee since an instrument bearing a forgery of the
payee's signature had been "paid," that is, the drawer's account has
been debited without authority. In turn, the drawee is said to have
an action against the collecting bank for breach of the latter's "prior
indorsements guaranteed" form of indorsement; the collecting bank
may then recover against the "cashing" bank which may recover
against the forger since payment over the forged necessary indorse-
ment of the payee was not final. The Feitel rule has its foundation in
the absence of privity of contract as between the payee and the
drawee or intermediary collecting banks, and in the absence of a
parallel to UCC § 3-419(1)(c).7 The overwhelming weight of NIL au-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 255 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
2. The Second Circuit's ruling is discussed in The Work of the Louiaiana Appel-
late Courts for the 1971-1972 Term-Commercial Paper, 33 LA. L. REV. 254 (1973).
3. Id.
4. 159 La. 752, 106 So. 292 (1925).
5. Id. at 761, 106 So. at 295.
6. Such a check no longer represents the drawer's order to the drawee.
7. The section provides that an instrument is converted when it is paid on a forged
indorsement, the drawee's liability for which is the face amount of the instrument.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Marine National Bank, 431 F.2d 341 (5th Cir.
1970), and Harry H. White Lumber Co. v. Crocker-Citizens National Bank, 61 Cal.
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thority from other jurisdictions, however, did allow the true owner of
a check to recover in a direct action against a collecting bank in such
circumstances.' On appeal to the Louisiana supreme court, the deci-
sion of the court of appeal permitting the co-payee's action against
the drawer was reversed on the basis that as between those two par-
ties there was a lack of consideration. Furthermore, the court reaf-
firmed the Feitel rule in dicta over the dissent of Justice Barham. The
majority viewed the issuance of the check in co-payee form as having
been for the "accommodation and convenience" of the plaintiff.'
Therefore, reasoned the majority, the plaintiff, not being a third
party holder in due course, had no recourse against the drawer who
in fact owed him nothing.'"
Justice Barham dissented from the holding of the majority that
the co-payee litigant had no claim against the drawer and from the
majority's reaffirmation of the Feitel jurisprudence." The majority
opinion cites Caskey v. Crawley'" as supportive of the proposition that
a co-payee, who is owed nothing by the drawer but who has been
made a co-payee by the drawer as an accommodation of or for the
convenience of the creditor co-payee, has no claim against the
drawer. That case, however, involved an action on a note by a payee
against an accommodation indorser who had so indorsed at the re-
quest of the maker and the payee, the court holding that such an
indorser was not liable to the payee. The drawer in Smith was not
an accommodation party."' Lack of consideration is, of course, a de-
fense against a holder other than a holder in due course, 4 but that
Rptr. 381 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967), are examples of co-payee conversion actions under
Section 419(1)(c). House-Evans Co. v. Matoon Transfer and Storage Co., 275 P.2d 268
(Okla. 1954), is an example of a co-payee direct action on a "moneys had and received"
theory.
8. See Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 670 (1965). A probable majority of jurisdictions hesi-
tated to permit such an action against the drawee if the drawee would, viz-a-viz an
action by the drawer, be exposed to double litigation.
9. Smith v. Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 272 So. 2d 678 (La. 1973). The drawer's
creditor was indebted to plaintiff Smith, and requested the drawer to issue checks in
co-payee style.
10. See Comment, 17 LA. L. REV. 466 (1957) (discussing the defenses of want and
failure of consideration in negotiable instruments).
11. See Fidelity Nat. Bank v. Vuci, 224 La. 124, 68 So. 2d 781 (1953); Fernon v.
Capital Bank & Trust Co., 190 So. 2d 504 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
12. 16 La. App. 415, 134 So. 711 (1st Cir. 1931).
13. LA. R.S. 7:29 (1950) states: "An accommodation party is one who has signed
the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor, as indorser, without receiving value there-
for and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person."
14. LA. R.S. 7:28, 58 (1950); Comment, 17 LA. L. REV. 466 (1957).
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issue is one of proof of fact as to which a party, such as the co-payee
litigant in Smith, should have an opportunity to prevail. 5 Considera-
tion need not be of the direct, tangible variety'" and case law can be
found which would tend to give the plaintiff in Smith a colorable
claim of valid consideration.' 7 Moreover, resort to sections 24 and 28's
leads to the observation that consideration refers to the validity of a
negotiable instrument, as a contract, at the time of issuance. Given
that one of two co-payees supplied a valuable consideration, it is
arguably irrelevant that the other supplied nothing.'
The decision of the Smith majority on the consideration issue
does not, however, appear to be the main thrust of Justice Barham's
dissent. Rather, like Justice Tate, who concurred in the majority
decision, Justice Barham assumed that certiorari had been granted
in Smith in order to review the Feitel rule as against the background
of an overwhelming contrary weight of authority.20 Justice Barham
takes the view that Louisiana should be governed by the majority rule
which prevailed in the other states when they operated under the
NIL. It was pointed out in the previous symposium issue of the
Review2' that a direct action by a drawer against a collecting bank
15. Under LA. R.S. 7:24 (1950) consideration is presumed, but this presumption
is a rebuttable one, and if consideration is put in issue by the introduction of evidence
which casts doubt on the reality of the consideration, the burden shifts to the plaintiff
(holder) to show consideration. Andrews v. Williams, 281 So. 2d 120 (La. 1973); Alex-
ander v. Occhipinti, 251 So. 2d 188 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
16. See, e.g., Dauzat v. Bordelon, 145 So. 2d 41 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) (check
given to pay a third person's debt held to be supported by valid consideration); Hale
v. Fornea, 79 So. 2d 124 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955) (son's check given to pay father's
indebtedness); Reiman Mfg. Co. v. Puccio, 1 La. App. 153 (Orl. Cir. 1924) (same).
17. See, e.g., Bank of American Nat. Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.
App. 3d 435, 84 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1970) (not necessary that anything of value pass from
payee to maker); Mason v. Blayton, 119 Ga. App. 203, 166 S.E.2d 601 (1969) (given
valid consideration for the promise contained in a check, the promisee has an action
against the drawer, notwithstanding that the promisee is a stranger to the considera-
tion); Goldberg v. Rothman, 66 Misc. 2d 981, 322 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1971) (maker's liabil-
ity to payee supported by consideration from a third person who was not a party to
the note).
18. LA. R.S. 7:24, 28 (1950). R.S. 7:24 states: "Every negotiable instrument is
deemed . . . to have been issued for a valuable consideration." (Emphasis added.)
19. But see Goldberg v. Rothman, 66 Misc. 2d 981, 322 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1971), in
which the maker-debtor issued the note payable to the wife of the creditor, and at the
creditor's request. The New York court found no problem of consideration despite the
fact that the payee-wife was owed nothing by the maker.
20. Smith v. Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 272 So. 2d 678, 684 (La. 1973) (concur-
ring opinion).
21. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972
Term-Commercial Paper, 33 LA. L. REV. 254 (1973). A direct action by the drawer
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might be reasonably disallowed by a court where, for example, the
drawer would thereby avoid defenses assertable by the drawee. This
disturbance of the positioning of the relative equities of the various
parties is perhaps a justification for the refusal of the majority in
Smith to use the case as a vehicle for the breakdown of the Feitel rule.
It is perhaps less inequitable, for instance, to retain Feitel and its
concomitant and seemingly needless involvement of parties in litiga-
tion, than to overturn it in a case in which a collecting or cashing
bank is perhaps thereby made liable with recourse only against a
forger, with respect to a check the payee of which could not, in the
court's view, have enforced as against the drawer."2 Moreover, the
noncircuitous NIL view would not necessarily permit a direct action
by a payee to whom the check was never delivered, 3 and who, like
the plaintiff in Smith, therefore never received title to it. 24 Such
issues aside, the obvious desire of the majority to retain the Feitel rule
is less defensible.
BANK-DOMICILED INSTRUMENTS
Debtors have been making instruments payable "at a bank"
since the early development of commercial banking in England.25
Prior to the adoption of section 8726 of the NIL it was unclear whether
banking practice regarded such instruments as a form of a draft on
an account in the named bank or rather as merely a designation by
the debtor of a convenient place for the parties to make payment.2 1
Under section 87 an instrument made payable "at a bank" is re-
garded as the equivalent of an order to the bank to pay the instru-
ment for the account of the principal debtor. The purpose of the
section was to settle the question of the bank's right, without specific
against a collective bank was allowed in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Marine National
Exchange Bank, 315 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Wis. 1970). See Comment, 88 BANK. L.J. 433
(1971).
22. See Gregory-Salisbury Metal Prod. v. Whitney Nat. Bank, 160 So. 2d 813 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1964).
23. See Jones v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 49 Cal. App. 2d 115,
121 P.2d 94 (1942); People ex rel. Nelson v. Kaspar Am. St. Bank, 364 Ill. 121, 4 N.E.2d
14 (1936). Contra, Allen v. M. Mendelsohn & Son, 207 Ala. 527, 93 So. 416 (1922);
Indiana Nat. Bank v. Holtsclaw, 98 Ind. 85 (1884); House-Evans Co. v. Matoon Tran.
and Stor., 275 P.2d 268 (Okla. 1954).
24. See Foltier v. Schroder & Schreiber, 19 La. Ann. 17 (1887); Estate, Inc. v.
Southern Land Title Corp., 230 So. 2d 341 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
25. See Steffen, Instruments "Payable At" A Bank, 18 U. CI. L. REv. 55 (1950).
26. LA. R.S. 7:87 (1950).
27. Id.
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authority, to pay such an instrument and charge the account of the
principal debtor. 8 The section has been generally construed to make
the bank the agent of the principal debtor. In Bollich v. Louisiana
Bank & Trust Company,29 the issue of first impression for the Third
Circuit Court of Appeal was: does section 87 apply to a draft payable
"through a bank." The draft in question was drawn by the president
of a rice company, on the rice company as drawee and payable to a
credit company. The purpose of the draft, which was payable
"through" defendant Louisiana Bank & Trust Company, was pay-
ment of certain moneys to the plaintiffs relating to the raising of a
rice crop. Plaintiffs received the draft on March 10, 1969, and within
one or two days delivered it to the U.S. Department of Agriculture
where it then was directed through government channels to the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank in New Orleans. The draft was then initially for-
warded to defendant Louisiana Bank & Trust as a "cash item," being
received by defendant on March 17, 1969, and returned by defendant
that same day to the Federal Reserve Bank with an accompanying
telegram to the effect that the draft was not a cash item and should
be re-entered as a collection item. Two days later defendant bank
again received the draft from the Federal Reserve Bank now marked
"for collection," but once again defendant returned the draft, this
time with an explanation that it had been presented to the drawer
but that defendant had not been able to effectuate collection.
Plaintiffs contended that such delay made defendant bank liable
as an acceptor under sections 136, 137,0 pursuant to which a drawee
must return an item delivered for acceptance within twenty-four
hours after delivery. If it does not do so, the instrument will be
deemed to have been accepted. Defendant countered with the appar-
ently solid argument that those sections apply to a "drawee" and that
the rice company-not defendant-was the drawee on the instru-
ment. The Third Circuit ruled, however, that a draft payable "at" a
bank is equivalent to an order to that bank to pay the draft for the
account of the drawee within the meaning of section 87 and that the
24-hour rule of sections 136, 137 would apply to such a bank even
though it is not the drawee.' Consistent with its handling of the draft,
28. Binghamton Phar. v. Memphis First Nat. Bank, 131 Tenn. 711, 176 S.W. 1038,
(1915).
29. 271 So. 2d 274 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
30. LA. R.S. 7:136, 137 (1950).
31. The court cited in support of the proposition First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. u.
First Nat. Bank, 260 Ky. 581, 86 S.W.2d 325 (1935) and Mt. Vernon Nat. Bank v.
Canby State Bank, 276 P. 262 (Ore. 1929).
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however, defendant argued that when an item is payable "through"
a bank there is a meaning beyond that which attaches to an item
payable "at" a bank-that the "through" items are understood to be
sent only for collection and not as cash items.32 The court disagreed,
concluding that no meaningful distinction existed between a draft
addressed to a drawee "at" a bank and one addressed "through" a
bank. Both terms, said the court, merely designate the bank where
the instrument is to be paid, without changing the duties of the bank
under sections 136, 137. The court's ruling that the draft was one
payable "at a bank" under section 87 also dispensed with the argu-
ment put forth by defendant that since the drawer and the drawee
were actually the same, it could under section 130 treat the item as
a promissory note and therefore outside of sections 136, 137.
The court's interpretation of section 87 is significant, but the
inquiry does not end there, since compliance with sections 136, 137
remains an issue. Plaintiffs argued that when the Federal Reserve
Bank forwarded the draft as a "cash" item, defendant should have
either accepted or rejected it under section 137 and that defendant's
act in merely returning it with a suggestion that it be re-entered as a
collection item violated sections 136, 137 with the result that the item
was deemed to be accepted. Since the draft was clearly neither de-
stroyed nor accepted 33 by defendant at that point, the question be-
came one of return of the draft as non-accepted. Under sections 149
and 150,'3 the court held that the return of the draft constituted a
32. Defendant maintained that under banking procedures a "cash item" is one
which the bank may pay without presentment to the drawer or drawee. The ordinary
check is an example of such an item, and if presented for acceptance rather than for
payment, the 24-hour rule would normally apply. A "collection item" on the other
hand, anticipates a collection effort by the bank-presentment-from the drawer or
drawee and therefore the 24-hour rule would not normally apply. Most checks, of
course, are presented for payment so that sections 136, 137 would not normally apply.
The defendant seems to have been following the Uniform Commercial Code in its
practice of handling "through" items-Section 3-120 says that an instrument which
states that it is payable "through" a bank designates that bank as a collecting bank
to make presentment "but does not of itself authorize the bank to pay the instrument."
See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-121, and the Comments to both of these
sections.
33. R.S. 7:132 states: "The acceptance of a bill is the signification by the drawee
of his assent to the order of the drawer. The acceptance must be in writing and signed
by the drawee. It must not express that the drawee will perform his promises by any
other means than the payment of money." In addition, the signification must be clear.
A drawee's signature accompanied by the phrase "kiss my foot," is not, for example,
an acceptance. Norton v. Knapp, 64 Iowa 112, 19 N.W. 867 (1884).
34. LA. R.S. 7:149, 150 (1950).
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dishonor by nonacceptance, and since return occurred within 24
hours of receipt as a cash item, there was no violation of section 137.
As to the second receipt of the draft section 137 did not apply since
the draft was received "for collection" and the bank thereby allowed
a reasonable time for collection.35 In reaching its conclusion that sec-
tion 137 was not violated by mere return of the instrument without
express dishonor, the court distinguished the case of First National
Bank v. Citizens Bank,3" a 1927 decision labelled by the court as a
landmark case under section 137.17
The Bollich decision has yet another significant aspect. The rice
company had maintained an account with the defendant for several
years, during which time the company paid for rice by the use of
drafts similar to the one given to plaintiffs. Upon receipt of such
drafts, defendant customarily contacted the company president,
whereupon a deposit would be immediately made in an amount suffi-
cient to cover the draft or drafts received. The company experienced
financial difficulties and began to fall behind in "covering" the drafts
as they were received by defendant. At some time during the week
preceding March 17, 1969, the company was given a deadline by
defendant of March 19, 1969 on which to cover back or "stale"
drafts.38 The deadline was not met, but on March 10, 1969, one of the
plaintiffs telephoned defendant's president to inquire about the draft
in question. Plaintiffs alleged that the failure of defendant's president
in that telephone conversation to disclose or warn plaintiffs of the
drawee's financial difficulties breached a duty to plaintiffs. The court
disagreed, finding neither the breach of any duty, fiduciary or other-
wise, nor any act of defendant which constituted negligence. Since
the court's ruling on the disclosure issue can be viewed as a failure
of proof by plaintiffs on the issue of the defendant bank's duty in that
regard, it should be pointed out that within the purview of two rela-
tively recent court decisions, any disclosures by banks of information
pertaining to customers' accounts or deposits invites liability. The
Idaho supreme court, 9 and more recently, the District Court of Ap-
peal of Florida,4" held that implicit in the agreement between a bank
and its customer is an obligation that the bank will not divulge to
35. See Womack v. Durrett, 24 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
36. 163 La. 919, 113 So. 147 (1927).
37. 271 So. 2d 274, 278 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
38. Many drafts which were received and which should have been paid as cash
items were held for more than 24 hours by the defendant.
39. Peterson v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961).
40. Milohnich v. First Nat. Bank, 224 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969).
300 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
third persons, without the customer's consent, express or implied,
either the state of the customer's account or of any of his transactions
with the bank or any information pertaining to the customer which
has been acquired through the keeping of his account, whether the
disclosure be made negligently, willfully, intentionally, or mali-
ciously. There is seemingly no reason that might inhibit the adoption
of this theory of bank-customer law by the Louisiana courts. The
predictability of such adoption is heightened by virtue of the recently
enacted Fair Credit Reporting Act,4' which has caused a re-evaluation
by bankers of the entire question of disclosure of customer informa-
tion to third parties-particularly information which bears on a con-
sumer's credit worthiness.2
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970).
42. For a discussion of the effect of the Fair Credit Reporting Act on banks see
Hersbergen, Representing The Creditor: A Guide To The New Ground Rules Of Ex-
tending and Collecting Credit, 21 DRAKE L. REV. 381, 385-93 (1972).
